Abstract-This paper presents a novel watermarking scheme able to resist geometric attacks. The proposed method performs imperceptible watermarking of images in the spatial domain. To generate resistance to scaling and rotation attacks, two generalized Radon transformations of the image are introduced, while resistance to translation is accomplished through a localization of the watermarking method based on feature points of the image. The original image is not required for the detection process. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that the proposed scheme is able to withstand a variety of attacks including common geometric attacks.
the detection. This can be achieved by embedding an additional template and reverting the geometric attack applied to the image based on the template's distortion [6] , [7] . However, these templates may be easy to remove [8] since they usually represent peaks in a transform domain. Other approaches of this category are based on the autocorrelation function (ACF) of a specially designed watermark as proposed in [9] , [10] .
Yet another approach for resisting geometric attacks is based on synchronizing (in terms of position, orientation and scaling) the watermark that is embedded in an image with the correlating watermark using image features. This is achieved by geometrically transforming a reference watermark based on features of the original image content during the embedding process, while in the detection process, features of the watermarked and possibly distorted image content are used in order to geometrically transform the reference watermark or even the image itself. Such an approach was presented in [11] where principal component analysis was used in order to define the geometric transformation parameters. Corner points [12] , [13] and facial feature points [14] have also been used for this purpose in other approaches of this category.
It should be noted that all methods mentioned above offer (or could offer in the case of [4] ) blind detection of the watermark without the use of the original image. However, nonblind watermark detection methods have also been proposed for resistance to geometric attacks [15] [16] [17] . Furthermore, other watermarking approaches have been proposed for resistance to geometric attacks, that are not directly linked to any one of the three main categories described above, e.g. in [18] [19] [20] .
In this paper, a novel image watermarking scheme that can resist geometric attacks is presented. It belongs to the third of the categories that were described above. Imperceptible watermark embedding and detection are performed in the spatial domain representation of the image luminance. The embedding and the correlating watermark are created by geometrically transforming a reference two-dimensional watermark. For the derivation of the geometric transformation parameters, both in the embedding and the detection processes, first a corner detection method is applied. Using a novel adaptation of the corner detector proposed in [21] corners in the image content are detected and the most robust among them, to geometric and other attacks, is determined. Then, this corner is used as an origin for two newly introduced one-dimensional generalized Radon transformations [22] [23] [24] that are applied to the image. According to characteristic values extracted from the two generalized Radon transformations the corresponding geometric transformation parameters are calculated. In this way, the geometrically transformed watermark that is embedded in an image and may be further transformed by a geometric attack is synchronized with the correlating watermark used for the detection process. Experimental evaluation of the proposed scheme demonstrates its resistance to geometric as well as other common attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the proposed one-dimensional generalized Radon transformations and their properties are analyzed. Section III describes the concept used in the proposed watermarking scheme for resisting geometric attacks. The proposed corner detector is described in Section IV. The watermark embedding scheme is presented in Section V. In Section VI, the detection process is described. In Section VII, the results of the experimental evaluation are presented, and finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. ONE-DIMENSIONAL GENERALIZED RADON TRANSFORMATIONS
We propose the use of two one-dimensional Generalized Radon transformations to provide resistance to scaling and rotation attacks, respectively. The radial integration transform (RIT) will be used for resistance to rotation, while the circular integration transform (CIT) will be used for resistance to scaling.
A. The RIT and CIT and Their Scaling and Rotation Properties
The RIT of a function is defined as the integral of along a straight line that begins from the origin and has angle with respect to the horizontal axis (see Fig. 1 ). The RIT is given by the following equation: (1) where is the distance from the origin . If is an image and is the image scaled by in both directions, then the RIT of image is easily found to be [23] (2) In other words, the RIT amplitude of the scaled image is only multiplied by the factor . If is an image written in polar form and is the image rotated by around the coordinate system's origin , then the RIT of image is easily determined to be [23] (3)
i.e., the RIT of the rotated image is translated by .
The CIT of a function is defined as the integral of along a circle curve with center and radius (see Fig. 2 ). The CIT is given by the following equation: (4) where is the elementary arc length over the integration path and is the corresponding elementary angle. The circle center will be referred to as the origin of the CIT. If is an image and is the image scaled by in both directions, then the CIT of image is easily found to be [23] 
Clearly, the CIT of the scaled image is scaled with the same scaling factor and its amplitude is also multiplied by the factor . If is an image expressed in polar coordinates and is the image rotated by around the coordinate system's origin , then the CIT of image is easily determined to be [23] (6) Clearly, the CIT of an image is independent of rotation. 
B. Discrete RIT and CIT
A discrete form of the RIT (1) is given by (7) where and are the constant step sizes of the corresponding variables, is the number of points that lie on the line with orientation and are located between the origin and the end of the image in that direction, and . The RIT ( , ) of the original and an attacked Lena image ( , , ) are shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b) , where the scaling and rotation properties of the proposed transform can be clearly identified. For example, the difference between the values of the parameters and which maximize the RIT coefficients of the attacked and the original Lena image, respectively, is 29.93 , which means that the divergence from the expected difference is only 0.07 . Similarly, a discrete form of the CIT (4) is given by (8) where and are the constant step sizes of the corresponding variables, is the radius of the smallest circle that encircles the image , and . The CIT ( , ) of the original and an attacked Lena image ( , , ) are shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b) , where the scaling and rotation properties of the proposed transform can be clearly identified. For example the quotient between the values of the parameters and which maximize the CIT coefficients of the attacked and the original Lena image, respectively, is 0.705, which means that the divergence from the expected quotient is only 0.005.
It should be noted that the image samples that appear in (7) and (8) may not coincide with pixels of the original image. This means that interpolation in both dimensions must be used. In our implementation of RIT and CIT bilinear interpolation was used.
The computational complexity of RIT and CIT are given by where is the order function.
III. RESISTING GEOMETRIC ATTACKS USING RIT AND CIT
The RIT and CIT properties given in (2) , (3), (5), and (6) are very desirable in watermarking applications in which resistance to geometric attacks on the watermarked image is required. A watermark embedding and detection scheme that utilizes these properties is described in the sequel.
In the embedding process, first a two-dimensional arbitrary reference watermark is generated. Then, a specific point of the image is selected based on properties of the image content. This point serves as the origin for RIT and CIT and also for positioning onto the image the geometrically transformed reference watermark, which will be created. Let the orientation of the reference watermark correspond to a reference angle and one of its dimensions (its width, for example) correspond to a reference size . Then, the RIT and CIT are calculated and the values of the parameters and which maximize the RIT and CIT coefficients, respectively, define the geometric transformation that the reference watermark should undergo before additive embedding in the original image. Specifically, the reference watermark is first scaled by the scaling factor (9) rotated by the angle (10) and positioned using the selected point , and then embedded in the image.
Let us assume a scaling and a rotation attack to the watermarked image by and , respectively. Based on the RIT and CIT properties, it is obvious that after the attack, the location of the new maximum will be for CIT and for RIT. Subsequently, in the detection process, if the reference watermark is scaled by the scaling factor and rotated by the angle , the embedding and the correlating watermark will be synchronized, i.e., acquire the same scale, orientation, and position which will in turn permit a successful detection.
This concept for resisting geometric attacks can only be applied if a specific location of the image content, that will be used as the origin, can be accurately traced both before embedding and before detection (possibly after a geometric attack that could change its position). The resulting method is highly dependent on the location of this origin. For this reason, a method is defined for the determination of the origin (corner point) so as to be very robust to geometric attacks, as detailed in Section IV.
Furthermore, the value of is selected based on a secret key of the owner, so as to achieve robustness to collusion attacks. Specifically, is drawn from a uniform distribution in [0 , 360 ] using a seed derived from the hash value of the owner's secret key concatenated, i.e. serially connected, with a unique image identifier (e.g. its catalog order). The value of is fixed. In this way, robustness to collusion attacks (as defined in [25] ) is achieved.
IV. CORNER DETECTION
Before embedding or detecting the watermark in the image, the location of the origin used for positioning the watermark and also for applying RIT and CIT must be found. For this reason, the corner points in an image are first found using a modified Harris corner detector [21] , and then the most appropriate is selected as the origin.
A Harris corner detector first calculates the horizontal and the vertical gradients of an image, and , respectively. Then, these two gradient images are low-pass filtered and the images and are obtained. For each pixel of the original image, the matrix is formed where range over all pixel positions that belong in a square area centered at the pixel . Using , the Harris corner detector output [21] for each image pixel is calculated (11) The Harris corner detector is a very good tool for extracting the corner points of an image. However, in our application we need to ensure that, in addition, the same set of corners is also extracted when the corner detector is applied to an attacked image. Specifically, the corner of the original image with the highest detector output should at least correspond to one of the corners of the attacked image that has one of the highest detector outputs.
In order to meet the above requirements, the following modifications were carried out so as to enhance the performance of the Harris corner detector. First, the terms that are summed in order to calculate each element of the matrix belong to circular areas of radius instead of square areas as in [21] . In this way, the detector output is less prone to significant alteration if subjected to a rotation attack.
Furthermore, in order to extract the set of corners, local maxima in circular areas of the corner detector output image are detected. Specifically, a pixel is considered a corner if its corner detector output value is higher than the value of all the pixels ( , ) that belong to a circular area of radius centered at the pixel This modified Harris corner detector is inherently more robust to geometric attacks (especially rotation). Furthermore, due to the low-pass filtering (Gaussian 5 5) of the image gradients, robustness of the detector to compression and interpolation (because of scaling or rotation) are also achieved. However, in order to determine which of the found corners will be more robust to a possible attack, a small number of attacks is first applied to the original image before the embedding process. The scheme that is used for generating scaling and rotation attacks to the original image in order to extract the most appropriate corner as the origin, is depicted in Fig. 5 , and is described in the following.
Consider the original image , its scaled versions , and its rotated versions , , where and are, respectively, the total number of the scaling and rotation attacks to be applied to the original image. For every and image created, the modified Harris corner detector is applied and the sets of corners and , respectively, are found. We shall now define the and operators which are used in order to register the corners extracted from the attacked images to the original image. The argument of the and operators is the set of corners and , respectively. Then, the set of the most robust corners of the original image is given by where is the set of corners that are detected by applying the modified Harris corner detector to the original image. Using the calculated modified Harris detector outputs, the corners that belong to each one of the sets , and are ranked according to the magnitude of the output. For every corner belonging to , its corresponding ranks in the sorted list from all attacked images are averaged. Normally, the corner with the smallest averaged rank is chosen as the origin used for positioning the watermark and also for applying the RIT and CIT to the original image. However, if the first corner in the sorted list lies in the outer 20% part of the image, the next corner in the sorted list is used as the origin. In this way, possible minor cropping attacks of the outer image part (i.e., meaningful cropping attacks that may not render the image unusable) will not influence the detection.
In our implementation, four scaling and three rotation attacks are applied to the image. The scaling factors used are 0.5, 0.75, 1.25 and 1.5, and the rotation angles are 22.5 , 45 , and 67.5 . In Fig. 6(a) , the corners that belong to the set for the image Lena are depicted (for , ). In Fig. 6(b) , the corners belonging to the set and the corner selected as the origin (white cross) are given.
Furthermore, in order to test the robustness of the proposed corner extraction scheme for the determination of the origin, the following experiment was conducted. The proposed modified Harris corner detector was used to extract a corner from each of some standard images, including the 512 512 Lena, Fishing Boat, Peppers, and F16 images. Then, the images were watermarked and all combinations of rotation (0 to 90 with a step of 10 ), scaling (scale factors ranging from 0.5 to 1.5, with a step of 0.05), jpeg compression and low-pass filtering were implemented. For each attacked image the Harris corner detector was used to find a set of corners and their rank in the sorted list. Then, it was determined whether any of the found corners corresponds to the corner found before the attack. In all experiments, the sought corner was found and its rank in the list was always lower than 7, as can be seen in Fig. 7 .
V. WATERMARK EMBEDDING

A. Watermark-Embedding Process
The proposed watermarking scheme, based on the concept described in Section III, performs the watermark embedding in the following steps (see Fig. 8 ).
• A random two-dimensional sequence of the values 1 and 1 is created based on a cryptographically secure procedure. Each value of the sequence is spread in blocks sized . This block-based watermark will be used as the reference watermark.
• The proposed corner detector is applied to the image. The detector extracts a set of corner points from which the most robust to geometric and other attacks is determined as described in Section IV.
• Using the location of the most robust corner as the origin, the RIT and CIT are applied to the image. Then, and are found and by using (9) and (10) the scaling parameter and the rotation parameter , respectively, are calculated.
• The reference watermark is geometrically transformed using the , and parameters for the rotation, the scaling and the translation, respectively.
• The amplitude of the watermark for each image pixel is determined as described in [26] in order to perform imperceptible watermark embedding. Then, the watermark is additively embedded in the spatial-domain representation of the image luminance. The embedding process is analyzed in the subsections that follow. 
B. Generation of the Initial Watermark
We shall assume the use of the following procedure for the generation of the embedding watermark: the values of the embedding watermark sequence are either 1 or 1. This sequence is produced from an integer random number generator by setting the watermark coefficient to 1 when the generator outputs a positive number and to 1 when the generator output is negative. The result is a zero mean, unit variance process. The random number generator is seeded with the result of a hash function. The MD5 algorithm [27] is used in order to produce a 128-bit integer seed from a meaningful message (owner ID). The watermark generation procedure is depicted in Fig. 9 . As explained in [28] , the watermark is generated so that even if an attacker finds a watermark sequence that leads to a high correlator output, the attacker still cannot find a meaningful owner ID that would produce the watermark sequence through this procedure and therefore cannot claim to be the owner of the image. This is ensured by the use of the hashing function included in the watermark generation.
The set of values that comprise the one-dimensional watermark sequence are positioned on a square image in raster scan order. The origin of the watermark is the point that corresponds to the center of the square. The watermark generation process is completed by spreading the watermark values in blocks sized . The resulting watermark has size , where , and where and are the indices of the watermark image and indicates downward truncation. This watermark is block based; that is, the watermark is divided into blocks of size , having the same value for all elements of the block. This is illustrated in Fig. 10 for , i.e., for 2 2 blocks. This resulting watermark is the reference watermark described in Section III.
The existence of a block-based watermark will compensate for possible de-synchronization between the embedded and the correlating watermark due to small errors in estimating the geometric transformation parameters for the correlating watermark during the detection process.
C. Watermark Transformation
First, the RIT and CIT of the image are calculated using the extracted most robust corner as the origin with coordinates . Then, the values of the parameters and which maximize the RIT and CIT coefficients, respectively, are found. These are used in order to calculate the scaling parameter and the rotation parameter using (9) and (10), respectively. In this way, the parameters for the geometric transformation of the watermark are found and the affine transformation matrix is formed (12) This affine transformation matrix is used for the rotation, scaling and translation (for positioning the watermark's origin on the detected corner point) of the watermark. Using , the geometrically transformed watermark is created. In our imple- mentation, linear interpolation was used, hence is valued in [ 1, 1] . Therefore, in order to preserve the watermark energy after the interpolation, we choose the embedding watermark by
D. Imperceptible Watermark Embedding
Every pixel of the image is watermarked by adding the corresponding value of the embedding watermark mul- tiplied by the strength factor . The watermarked pixel is given by (14) The strength factor for every pixel should be calculated in such a way that the watermark embedding leads to imperceptible visual degradation of the image. This is achieved by taking into account the local variance of the image luminance, which serves as a measure of the watermark magnitude that could be imperceptibly embedded in each image pixel. For this reason, first the variance in a square area of pixels for each image pixel is calculated. Then the maximum variance is found and used for the normalization of the variances in the range [0, 1]. Specifically, is given by (15) where is the strength of the watermark that will be embedded in the case of a pixel whose neighborhood has zero variance (smooth area) and is the maximum strength that the first term of the right hand side of (15) will contribute to the final watermark strength factor . After experimenting with several combinations of values for and , we selected the values and . In fact, in a set of 500 photographic images, taken from [29] , where the watermark was embedded, these values produced no noticeable degradation of the image quality and the minimum and average PSNR observed were 39.97 and 41.76 dB, respectively. Fig. 11 presents the original 512 512 Lena image, the corresponding watermarked image and their difference.
Alternatively, other methods for additive watermark embedding in the spatial domain that use sophisticated perceptual models, like the ones presented in [30] and [31] , may be used, at the expense, however, of additional computational complexity.
VI. DETECTION
A. Description of the Detection Process
For the detection of the watermark, a correlation-based detectionscheme is applied [32] [33] [34] . The detection process can be divided in the following steps (see Fig. 12 ).
1) The watermark is created using the owner's ID and is then transformed to a block-based watermark , as in the embedding process.
2) The modified Harris corner detector is applied to the image.
3) The RIT and CIT of the image are calculated using the location of the corner detector output maximum as the origin. Then, the values of the parameters and that maximize the RIT and CIT coefficients, respectively, are found. 4) Using , , and the values of , that were used in the embedding, the scaling parameter and the rotation parameter that will be used to geometrically transform the correlating watermark are calculated. 5) The correlating watermark is created by first geometrically transforming the watermark using (12) , and then by applying the sign function to the values of the geometrically transformed watermark as in the embedding process.
6) The local mean of the luminance of each pixel of the test image is calculated (16) where and are integers such that each pixel belongs to an area and is the number of pixels included in . This area contains all test image pixels belonging to a window centered at , for which does not belong to the same watermark block as . This is done in order to exclude from the local mean the pixel values that correlate with , which would decrease the detector performance for the reasons described in [35] . 7) The correlation value between the watermarked and the, possibly distorted, image pixel values , reduced by the local mean , and the watermark values is calculated (17) 8) The correlation value is compared to an image adaptive threshold, which is defined as is described in the following. 
B. Calculation of the Image Adaptive Threshold
The detection can be formulated as the following statistical hypothesis test:
: the test image is not watermarked. : the test image is watermarked. In order to determine which of the above hypotheses is true, the correlation-based detection expressed in (17) is applied and then the correlation value is compared to a threshold. In order to define the threshold, we first performed a statistical analysis of the correlator output similar to the one performed in [36] . In the following, the results of this analysis are presented. Specifically, the mean values and the variances of the correlator output corresponding to each hypothesis , are given by the following equations: (18) (19) and (20)- (21), as shown at the bottom of the page, where range over all pixel positions within the test image, , are integers such that the pixel belongs to the block of the correlating watermark containing pixel , , , and , are integers such that the pixels and belong to the areas and , respectively, and is the number of pixels included in . The correlation value , in (17) has mean and variance given by (18) and (20) under hypothesis , and (19) and (21) under hypothesis . In addition, since the last two terms on the right-hand side of the sum (21) were experimentally found to have very small values compared to other terms.
The watermark detection system error probability is given by , where is the false positive probability (detection of the watermark under ), is the false negative probability (failure to detect the watermark under ) and equal a priori probabilities for both hypotheses are assumed. As argued in [28] , if the number is large enough, the sum (17) will contain enough independent terms for the central limit theorem [37] to be applicable. Thus, will be approx- (20) (21) imately normally distributed and the analytical expressions of and will be given by
where is the threshold against which the correlator output is compared and is defined as (24) Since , it can be easily proven that the threshold selection which minimizes the detection error probability (maximum a posteriori criterion) is given by (25) However, as noted in [32] for the case of watermarking DCT coefficients, this is not an accurate expression for the best threshold, mainly because in case of attacks the mean value is not accurately estimated using (19) . In fact, experimental results have shown that in case of attacks the experimental mean of the correlation value under is smaller than the theoretical mean calculated using (19) . For this reason, the threshold is selected which leads to the minimum probability of false negative errors while keeping false positive errors at an acceptable rate (Neyman-Pearson criterion). By solving (22) for T, we obtain (26) Equation (26) can be used for the calculation of the threshold for a fixed , since and can be reliably calculated using (18) and (20), respectively.
If the point with the maximum corner detector output during detection is not the same with the one used as origin in the embedding, the detection will fail. In such cases, the correct corner is usually one of the subsequent corners in the list where the detected corners are ranked according to the magnitude of the detector output. For this reason, the detection process in Section VI-A is repeated, starting from the third step and using the location of a small number of the subsequent corners of the list as the origin for the RIT and CIT.
Furthermore, during embedding, the global RIT (or CIT) maximum may be very close to one or more local RIT (or CIT, respectively) maximum. Following an attack the latter may become a global maximum which will lead to a detection failure. Thus, when during detection a global and a local maximum of RIT or CIT are found to be very close, the detection process is repeated starting from the fourth step and using also the local maximum position as or , respectively. As a result, the number of corners tested will slightly increase. The detection procedure will be performed times and the maximum of correlation values will be the final detector output. Since the event is equivalent to the event that at least one of the correlation values is larger than , the total false positive probability of the detection system is found, using the binomial distribution, by: (27) If (27) is solved for , the final threshold is obtained by: (28) Given a fixed total false positive probability, (28) is used for determining the image adaptive threshold for the watermark detection, based on the Neyman-Pearson criterion.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Setting of Parameters
The experiments presented in the following were all performed using the following values for the parameters of the watermarking system: , for the modified Harris corner detector, , for the discrete RIT, , for the discrete CIT, for the calculation, , for the block-based reference watermark, , , for the determination of the embedding strength, and , and for the detection process. Linear interpolation was used for the geometric transformations of the watermark.
B. Implications of the Watermark Interpolation
As described in Section V-C linear interpolation is used for the geometrical transformation of the watermark. In the absence of an attack the correlating watermark will be identical to the embedded. In case of geometric attacks however, the embedded watermark is corrupted and hence not identical to the correlating watermark . In order to evaluate the mismatch of embedded and correlating watermarks the following experiment was conducted: the embedding procedure was applied for various test images and the values of were determined; then all combinations of rotation (ranging from 0 to 90 with a step of 5 ) and scaling attacks (scale factors ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 with a step of 0.05) were implemented, using linear interpolation for each geometric attack. The corresponding correlating watermark was also created using linear interpolation. The sign of the values of of the attacked embedded watermark was compared to the sign of the values of the correlating watermark. Fig. 13 presents the percentage of the corresponding values of the two watermarks that had the same sign for image Lena. Similar results were also obtained for other test images. As can be seen in Fig. 13 , in all cases of attacks this percentage is very high, always above 93%, demonstrating robustness of the detection procedure to geometric attacks. This is partly due to the block-based structure of the embedded watermark. Robustness is further verified by the results of the next subsection. 
C. Detection Performance
In our experiments, first the calculation of the mean and the variance of the correlation value under using (18) and (20), and also the validation of these results by estimating the above parameters through detection experiments with a large number of different watermarks were performed. For this reason, first the theoretical mean and variance for the case of hypothesis were calculated for the image Lena using (18) and (20) . Then the detection procedure described in Section VI-A was applied to the original unwatermarked Lena image for 10 000 different watermarks and the empirical mean and variance values were found. The theoretical and experimental values of the means and variances were identical and equal to and . On replacing these values in (27) the total false positive probability versus the threshold for the image Lena was obtained. The corresponding plot is shown in Fig. 14 where the total false positive probability for different values of is given. The bold solid line corresponds to which was the value used in the rest of the experiments, since this number of corners proved sufficient for reliable detection and at the same time it did not severely influence the total false positive probability.
In order to evaluate the detector performance under , detection experiments based on 500 different watermarks for the watermarked and attacked Lena image were performed. The attacks applied to the watermarked Lena images included rotation, scaling, JPEG compression, JPEG2000 compression, Gaussian noise addition and Gaussian low-pass filtering. Fig. 15 illustrates the distribution of the correlation value for each attack and also for the case where no attack was present. In all cases of attacks the correlation value was above the image adaptive threshold for the selected total false positive probability . In addition, the correlation value for the watermarked image Lena using 500 different correlating watermarks is given in Fig. 16 .
For the last class of experiments, the Stirmark 3.1.79 watermark removal software [1] , [38] was used. The Lena, Peppers, Bear, and F16 images were first watermarked and then used in the tests. The PSNR of all images was higher than 41.6 dB. The following classes of attacks were implemented: signal enhancement, JPEG compression, scaling, rotation, row/column removal, random geometrical distortions, general linear geometric transformations, and shearing. The effects of each attack were also evaluated following JPEG compression at a quality factor of 90. To each image a score of 1 is assigned if the watermark is detected and 0 if not detected. In Table I the average score for each class of attacks is given. In particular, in all signal enhancement attacks apart from sharpening, the watermark was successfully detected. Signal enhancement included gaussian lowpass filtering, sharpening, frequency mode Laplacian removal attack, and also median filtering with kernels 2 2, 3 3 and 4 4. The compression attacks included JPEG compression with quality levels of 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90. In most cases, the watermark was detected even for the lowest quality factors resulting in a 0.83 score. The watermark was detected in all downscaling and upscaling attacks performed by Stirmark. In case of rotation attacks the scheme also performed very well. Finally, the scheme's performance was satisfactory under row/column removal attacks (the 1 1, 1 5, 5 1, 5 17 and 17 5 cases were tested).
The last three rows of Table I include attacks that perform local geometric attacks (Random Geometric Distortions), nonuniform scaling (General Linear Geometric Transformations) and shearing. Although the proposed watermarking scheme is not designed for resistance to such attacks, the watermark was detected in most cases. More specifically, the watermark was detected after all General Linear Geometric Transformations and all shearing attacks in which the shift in each direction is up to 1% of the image's corresponding dimension. The watermark was also detected after applying random geometric distortions to three out of the four watermarked test images. The correct detection in all these cases is due to the block-based structure of the watermark which compensates for the errors in the estimation of the scaling, rotation, and positioning parameters of the correlating watermark.
It should finally be noted that the proposed watermarking scheme is inherently robust to translation attacks, due to the positioning of the watermark according to the image content before embedding or detection. Furthermore, collusion attacks using images of the same owner are not possible because they are watermarked with different geometric transformations of the same watermark. 
D. Bitstream Embedding and Extraction
Watermarking is a technology that can be used for various data hiding applications. Apart from its use for proving the copyright ownership described in the previous sections, additional information (small bitstreams) can be embedded in an image using a variation of the proposed watermarking technique (data hiding). For example, such additional information could be the identification number of a buyer. By using this information "malicious buyer tracking" can be achieved, i.e., when copyrighted material is found to be used by unauthorized users, the initial buyer, who allowed the unauthorized use of the copyrighted material to a third party, can be traced.
One way to embed such bitstreams into images is to modulate the reference watermark with the bits of the bitstream before embedding it to the host image. Specifically, after transforming all 0-bit values to 1, every bit of the bitstream is used to multiply the reference watermark values in selected positions and then the modulated watermark is geometrically transformed and embedded in the image as described in Section V.
In order to extract the bit values from a watermarked image, first the first six steps of the detection procedure described in Section VI are applied. Then, for each bit , the sum is calculated (29) where and are integers such that each corresponds to a location where the bit is expected to be embedded. Finally, is assigned the value 0 if is negative and the value 1 if is positive.
Using the above described procedure for bitstream embedding, 64 bits were embedded in the image Lena. The attacks applied to the watermarked Lena image included rotation by 10 , downscaling with scaling factor 0.7, JPEG2000 compression to 0.8 bits/pixel, JPEG compression with , addition of Gaussian noise with and gaussian filtering (5 5) . In all cases of attacks, all 64 bits were successfully extracted.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A novel watermarking scheme for copyright protection which is robust to geometric transformations was presented. The scheme is based on the properties of the RIT and CIT generalized Radon transformations and manages to synchronize the watermark that is embedded in an image with the correlating watermark in case of geometric attacks. Furthermore, the watermark detection process was proven to be robust to geometric attacks (rotation, scaling, translation), as well as other attacks such as compression, low-pass filtering, and noise addition.
Future work will focus on applying the proposed method to regions of the image instead of the entire image. These regions may be defined using the extracted set of robust corners in order to form Voronoi diagrams or Delaunay tessellations, as proposed in [13] and [12] , respectively. In this way, further robustness to attacks may be achieved.
